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There is evidence that noninvasive brain stimulation (NIBS), and especially transcranial
direct current stimulation (tDCS), can improve some cognitive functions, at least
temporarily. However, as the improvement only applies to some “lucky” people, it
may raise ethical, social and legal issues related to fairness in selective contexts
(exams, competitions, job interviews). In this regard, an important element tends to be
overlooked: the variability in individual response to tDCS in particular. If intensive study
or practice and massive doses of chemical enhancers can have slightly different effects
over different people, tDCS can sometimes be completely ineffective. The variability in
individual response, if tDCS were widely used, could add to the already present natural
inequalities between people, or even create new ones, leaving some in a disadvantaged
condition. The discussion of the various ethical, social and legal consequences of
different individual responses to tDCS might also address a potential indirect intervention
by the State. In fact, if NIBS were to be widespread in competitive contexts, those who
do not benefit from tDCS would be disadvantaged compared to those able to enhance
their skills thanks to neuromodulation technologies. The most disadvantaged people for
their lower response to tDCS could then acquire the right to receive and use free and
safe cognitive enhancing drugs or other forms of bettering cognitive skills and functions,
so as to reduce the gap between them and those who respond well to tDCS, in the light
of the principle of equal opportunity.
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INTRODUCTION
Noninvasive brain stimulation (NIBS) seems to have recently become the new frontier of
enhancement for healthy subjects (Cohen Kadosh, 2014; Dubljevi´c et al., 2014; Bain et al., 2015).
Pharmacological interventions aimed at increasing cognitive skills have so far attracted the scholars’
attention (Farah et al., 2004; Greely et al., 2008; Savulescu and Bostrom, 2009; Sahakian et al.,
2015), also as regards their ethical, social and legal implications. Indeed, molecules able to influence
human executive functions have long been available and arouse questions with respect to their
distribution in self-administration without medical supervision. Although there are no reliable
data, it is believed that many professionals and college students make use of chemical enhancers
(Sahakian and Morein-Zamir, 2007; Vrecko, 2013).
In the last few years, though, there has been growing evidence that NIBS—and especially
transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS), the most used technique—can improve some
cognitive functions, at least temporarily, thanks to the effects of neuromodulation, i.e., the
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facilitation of the excitability and discharge capacity of neurons
through weak current (1–2 mA) applied with electrodes placed
on the scalp (Chi and Snyder, 2012; Hauser et al., 2013; McKinley
et al., 2013; Snowball et al., 2013; Brunoni and Vanderhasselt,
2014; Coffman et al., 2014; Mayseless and Shamay-Tsoory, 2015;
Parkin et al., 2015; Podda et al., 2016).
For example, tDCS improved the vigilance and target
detection of pilots. Twenty seven Air Force soldiers were
stimulated with tDCS (2 mA for 30 min, anode in area F10)
and then given the synthetic aperture radar target learning
task, consisting of a radar simulator with red or blue circular
patterns in which participants had to identify the target stimuli
(for example, vehicles or missiles; McKinley et al., 2013). Each
target stimulus could appear in different points of space. Each
participant received 90 min of preparatory training for the task
and a tDCS session. Anodal tDCS produced improvement in the
accuracy of the visual search task by about 25% compared to the
sham (placebo) group.
This has promptly triggered the reflections of both
neuroscientists working with NIBS and ethicists trying to
sketch a framework within which to evaluate the enhancement
of healthy individuals (Cohen Kadosh et al., 2012; Bikson et al.,
2013;Walsh, 2013; Cabrera et al., 2014; Maslen et al., 2014; Davis,
2015; Riggall et al., 2015). However, many rapid developments,
also under the pressure of private industries, are changing both
the spread of tDCS and, more importantly, its ethical, social and
legal implications.
First of all, as regards the spread of tDCS, the so-called
do-it-yourself (DIY) approach is contributing to the increase of
the individual use of NIBS (Fitz and Reiner, 2013; Jwa, 2015;
Maslen et al., 2015; Wexler, 2015). This phenomenon primarily
happens through the promotion, on dedicated websites, of the
(alleged) potential of tDCS and the sharing of instructions
for self-administration according to the desired results. Unlike
chemical enhancers, devices for tDCS are free to sell and not
subject to medical prescriptions. In addition, their cost is low
enough to be accessible to a wide audience. There are also
instructions on how to build a device yourself, which is relatively
cheap and not particularly difficult for anyone with some degree
of technical expertise.
Second, largely due to the experiments carried out by private
companies, but also on the basis of scientific experiments
published in peer-reviewed journals (Davis, 2013; Sales et al.,
2016) the attention has been recently brought to the possibility
to enhance athletic performance thanks to tDCS. In particular, it
has emerged that some athletes who went to the 2016 Olympics
in Rio de Janeiro have been trained also using tDCS to
stimulate the motor cortex (Strickland, 2016). According to
data published by Halo Neuroscience and reported also by
Nature (Reardon, 2016), stimulation on some US ski jumpers
has improved the athletes’ jumping force by 70% and their
coordination by 80%, compared to the sham group. Another
research soon to be published in a peer-reviewed journal, recently
presented by LexMauger of the University of Kent (March 2016),
shows that direct current stimulation can reduce the athletes’
subjective fatigue, which affects their performance. Among the
published studies, one has achieved a reduction in perceived
fatigue and a consequent increase in performance by stimulating
the temporal cortex (which has an important role in body
awareness and automatic functions) of cyclists (Cogiamanian
et al., 2007).
Another study has found that healthy subjects with no
previous experience with golf, when stimulated with tDCS,
improved implicit motor learning (Zhu et al., 2015). In this
study, 25 healthy individuals practiced a golf putting task during
a training phase while receiving either real cathodal tDCS
stimulation over the left DLPFC area or sham stimulation.
The stimulation enhanced golf putting performance. In the
authors’ opinion, cathodal tDCS ‘‘suppresses verbal working
memory activity, which would reduce explicit verbal-analytical
engagement in movement control, thereby promoting implicit
motor learning’’ (Zhu et al., 2015).
SPECIFIC FEATURES OF DIBS
Despite the controversial data (Brunoni and Vanderhasselt,
2014; Coffman et al., 2014), it therefore seems that different
applications of tDCS may have enhancement effects, both on the
cognitive side and on the athletic side. This means that NIBS on
healthy subjects should be considered a special case compared to
other forms of enhancement, especially as regards its social and
ethical implications. In fact, with chemical enhancers there is a
sharp distinction between doping and cognitive enhancement.
Doping in sport is certainly very effective, often involves health
risks and almost always has clearly identifiable side effects; but
it is a socially stigmatized practice, forbidden by the regulations
and severely punished (although some ethicists have proposed
arguments to accept it; see Savulescu et al., 2004; Cashmore,
2010). Chemical cognitive enhancement, instead, is certainly
less effective (Repantis et al., 2010) and its spread is still
almost entirely unregulated. Debate on ethical, social and legal
implications of human enhancement is very open, with the two
main fronts of bio-libertarians and bio-conservatives (Racine,
2010). The former highlight the helpfulness of enhancers, capable
to solve many problems, and are in favor of the unrestricted use
of every kind of enhancing means (Caplan, 2004), the latter stress
the negative impact on personal achievement and wish for their
strict regulation and, sometimes, even their prohibition (Sandel,
2009).
NIBS seems to encompass the possibility of enhancing a
subject both cognitively and athletically, even though significant
effects are yet to be confirmed through further studies. Although
it hasn’t been yet approved as a therapeutic tool by the FDA
or other entities entrusted with health authorizations, tDCS is
traded freely and no sporting regulations prohibit or limit its
use. Only after the news that Olympic athletes have used NIBS
did the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) decide to monitor
the use of tDCS, in order to evaluate whether to include it in
the list of treatments forbidden by the International Olympic
Committee (IOC; Strickland, 2016). The main general criteria
established by IOC to be included in the list are risks for
the athlete’s health and potential violation of sportsmanship.
tDCS is however considered substantially safe (Bikson et al.,
2016).
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Furthermore, NIBS has specific features that seem to imply
serious ethical consequences:
1. The abovementioned ease of unlimited self-administration:
once you have a tDCS device, you can use it as long as you
wish. On the contrary, with a few exceptions, one always
depends on others for the availability of chemical enhancers.
2. The variability of the effects of the stimulation both in
the same individual at different times and, above all,
between individuals (to the current state of knowledge).
The percentage of non-responders varies according to the
protocols in which the stimulation is used, but there is
evidence that this is a widespread phenomenon (Datta et al.,
2012; Meiron and Lavidor, 2013; Krause and Cohen Kadosh,
2014; López-Alonso et al., 2014; Wiethoff et al., 2014; Chew
et al., 2015). Inter-individual variability can lead to problems
of equality of opportunity, since the different response to
NIBS is linked to features the person cannot intervene on, for
example skull thickness, subcutaneous fat levels, cerebrospinal
fluid density and cortical surface topography (Horvath et al.,
2014).
3. The non-detectability of the use of NIBS on healthy
individuals with purposes of cognitive or athletic
enhancement (to the current state of knowledge). This
does not allow one to implement control measures or bans
of the use of NIBS, except in very invasive manners and in
particular circumstances (for example, by monitoring athletes
long before the race).
Taken together, these three elements contribute to the
complexity of the ethical, social and legal implications of
NIBS, which therefore requires a wider and better outlined
framework. In general, the performance enhancement that can
be currently achieved through NIBS seems not to be yet such as
to create, under equal initial conditions, very strong differences
between an individual ‘‘enhanced’’ thanks to tDCS and a ‘‘non-
enhanced’’ one. However, neuromodulation technologies are
still young and promise to grow rapidly in both precision and
reach. Therefore it is justified to worry about the consequences
of the increasing popularization of devices for tDCS for the
purpose of enhancing healthy individuals. In fact, this may
raise relevant issues related to fairness in competitive (races
and athletic competitions) and selective contexts (exams, public
competitions, job interviews).
Another theme worthy of consideration is that of safety.
It is true that literature has not highlighted any damages or
side effects of transcranial current direct stimulation, if not
fleeting headaches and rare skin lesions (Frank et al., 2010).
Recently, though, a group of authoritative scholars has written
an Open Letter regarding DIY users of tDCS (Wurzman
et al., 2016). They warn their readers that ‘‘stimulation
affects more of the brain than a user may think’’, since
‘‘stimulation extends well beyond the regions beneath the
electrodes’’. The key points raised by Wurzman et al. (2016)
are the following: (1) ‘‘Stimulation interacts with ongoing
brain activity, so what a user does during tDCS changes
tDCS effects’’; (2) ‘‘Enhancement of some cognitive abilities
may come at the cost of others. Stimulating one brain area
may improve the ability to perform one task but hurt the
ability to perform another’’; (3) ‘‘Changes in brain activity
(intended or not) may last longer than a user may think’’;
and (4) ‘‘Small differences in tDCS parameters can have a big
effect. Mild changes in tDcs settings including current amplitude,
stimulation duration, and electrode placement can have big and
unexpected effects’’ (see also Davis and van Koningsbruggen,
2013).
In the light of these considerations, and given the likely
increase in use of tDCS if its use for sports enhancement will
prove to be effective, it seems prudent to pay greater attention
(even preventively) to NIBS as a means of enhancing healthy
individuals. What’s at stake is not only the users’ safety but
also the principle of fair competition (encompassing justice and
equity): it is auspicable to avoid that someone might unfairly take
advantage of the situation to the detriment of others without
good reasons and that someone has a undue burden on her
fundamental rights (Lavazza and Garasic, 2017). In this scenario,
it is important to analyze the role that can be played by the state,
both as a regulator and as a ‘‘balancer’’ (provided that NIBS isn’t
prohibited altogether).
ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS
The debate on enhancers is very heated and cannot be dealt
with extensively here. The positions range from the complete
rejection of cognitive enhancers and the proposal to ban them
up to their full acceptance and active promotion (Garasic
and Lavazza, 2016). Each position, consistent with its own
assumptions, gives a specific role to the State as an entity
capable of imposing universally applicable rules. Simplifying,
bio-conservative positions tend to promote individual effort
and the acceptance of one’s natural endowments, entailing
the restriction and/or prohibition of enhancers (President’s
Council on Bioethics, 2003). Bio-liberal positions, instead,
privilege individual freedom and autonomous choice, rejecting
the implementation of any general rules (Juth, 2011). These two
families of positions have different views of individual flourishing
and the goals that a just society should pursue, but both give value
to equality of opportunity, fairness and justice.
As for the possible indirect interventions of the State, the
first theme to address is that of safety. Faced with the spread of
tDCS and the lack of univocal scientific data about the (actual or
potential) risks and side effects of an intensive and/or long-term
use of tDCS, it is necessary to carry out targeted and thorough
studies, both on animal models and on human beings. These
studies have little chance of being funded and carried out by
university researchers because they are expensive and not very
‘‘profitable’’ in terms of scientific publications. It is even less
likely that they should be systematically carried out by private
companies involved in the production and trade of devices for
tDCS. The State could then promote such studies for public
health, either through the structures in charge of ensuring the
safety of products for sale or by financing scholars working on
tDCS.
Another element to consider, which is what interests us here,
is that the use of NIBS for the cognitive and athletic enhancement
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of healthy subjects could increase the already present natural
inequalities between people, or even create new ones, leaving
some individuals in a disadvantaged condition. In fact, if NIBS
were to be widespread in competitive contexts, those who do
not benefit from tDCS would be more disadvantaged compared
to those able to enhance their skills thanks to neuromodulation
technologies. In this sense, the strong inter-individual variability
that seems to characterize NIBS is an additional and important
feature due to which the means to counter inequalities are
different compared to chemical enhancers. Thus, the use of NIBS
seems to require different policies in order to restore the equality
of opportunities.
THE ROLE OF THE STATE
How should the State intervene in this case? The answer is not as
univocal as in the case of safety. Indeed, for some professionals,
cognitive enhancement (and perhaps even athletic enhancement:
think of firefighters, but also the police, although with some
caution) may be of benefit to the whole society and, given the
absence of risk and considering the limited number of people
involved, this might even translate in a duty of enhancement,
as some have argued (Santoni de Sio et al., 2014). Indeed, it has
been claimed that people like surgeons, some shift workers, and
air traffic controllers could have a moral duty to improve their
performance with any tools that become progressively available.
And this duty could be enforced by the State itself. A plausible
objection to this argument is the rejection of coercion to medical
treatment and the general principle that people shouldn’t be used
as means, whatever their profession.
However, if this argument may hold for chemical enhancers
(where one should still assume a degree of inter-individual
variability of effectiveness, as happens for any drug), it is
certainly much less convincing for NIBS, which seems to produce
changing effects over time both on the same individual and
between different individuals. This makes it so that one shouldn’t
rely more on, say, enhanced surgeons, because tDCS doesn’t
always have the same effects in terms of improved attention
and coordination (Garasic and Lavazza, 2015). This would
produce an unacceptable discrimination if it were decided to
only offer such jobs to those who respond well to NIBS; people
unresponsive to NIBS don’t seem comparable to those who,
due to serious physical or psychological handicaps, are not
allowed to perform surgery, as in the latter case there are
objective difficulties that prevent them from practicing their
profession.
The problem of potentially increasing inequalities thus
remains, both due to the different ability to access to NIBS
(despite its easy use and low cost) and, mostly, due to the intra-
and inter-individual variability of its effects. In this case, if the
state is willing to intervene, it seems to have two options: either
to ban NIBS or to implement policies of ‘‘re-balancing’’, as we
have suggested earlier. In fact, one could object that the state
should do nothing in this field and let things go unaffected. This
option is consistent both with the view that tDCS is not and
will not be a social and legal problem at all, and with the view
that the state should not regulate people’s personal choice to
enhance themselves, once it is proven that safety is guaranteed.
Nevertheless, if one recognizes that the widespread use of tDCS
can give rise to a problem of inequality and that the state has a
duty to intervene, one has to consider the two abovementioned
options.
The ban hypothesis can be rejected due to the importance, in
Western societies, of the principle of individual autonomy: the
subject must be free to choose (hopefully with full competence
and information) their goals and how to reach them, so long as
the freedom of others is also respected (Lavazza, forthcoming). In
this sense, the assessment of the safety of NIBS, also promoted by
the state, would allow the individual to make an informed choice,
knowing whether or not they would face any risks. It can also be
argued that the diffusion of enhancements (especially cognitive
ones) would benefit society as a whole, with consequences,
of varying significance, for all. In fact, it is not implausible
to think that the growth of cognitive abilities would lead to
an increase of the collective expertise available and facilitate
the smooth functioning of the institutions and services that
are open to all. However, there is still the crucial problem
of fairness and equality of opportunity between citizens. As
is known, inequalities in income and wealth, social standing
and ability to improve one’s condition constitute one of the
most corrosive factors of individual welfare and social relations
and, ultimately, of society as a whole (Sen, 1992; Deaton, 2013;
Atkinson, 2015).
What the state could do then, as for the enhancers considered
here, is allow those with low response to tDCS to use other
free and safe cognitive enhancing drugs or different forms of
cognitive and/or motor augmentation (more effective for that
individual) to improve cognitive skills and functions (specific
courses, guided exercises), so as to reduce the gap between them
and those who respond well to tDCS, in the light of the principle
of equal opportunity. Another form of public intervention could
be to subsidize research in neuromodulation technologies and
other forms of artificial enhancement, so that fewer people would
be excluded from cognitive enhancement effects because of their
particular physical constitution.
In this way the State would not play the role of a
direct regulator, intervening through specific regulations or
the prohibition of NIBS (unless health risks were to emerge
from further studies), but simply that of a ‘‘balancing’’ factor.
It should also be underlined that prohibiting NIBS would be
at least partially ineffective, since it’s currently impossible to
determine a subject’s use of that specific enhancement. As a
result, the only way to effectively enforce the ban on the use of
brain enhancement through stimulation devices, even in specific
areas such as high-level selective contexts (like competitions for
management positions), would be to isolate the candidates for a
long time in controlled environments.
Rather than limiting the use of NIBS, the State could
therefore implement an indirect intervention aimed at correcting
potential imbalances due to the spread of cerebral enhancers
whose selective effects may end up increasing inequality between
citizens in terms of cognitive and athletic skills. In particular,
supporting the research on efficient and egalitarian enhancers
would be an important contribution to the welfare of society.
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Obviously, it should be specified that, at least for some time,
the only fields affected would likely be very competitive specific
areas of society involving a limited number of people. However,
despite their relative specificities, these spheres are very delicate
because a growing number of people are using enhancement
of various kinds, often at the price of significant side effects.
In this case, the balancing role of the State, in some situations,
would be complicated by the fact that (say) the candidate for a
certain position or a top athlete may have already made use of
all available enhancers: in this case, there would be no way for
the State to compensate for the different starting positions other
than to attribute a sort of handicap to those who have a greater
benefit from enhancers thanks to their physical constitution. In
other words, in selective-competitive contexts, the candidates’
performance rankings should be corrected ex post, at least in
part, so as to protect an actual equality of opportunity. In this
way, implicitly, one would sacrifice efficiency for justice and
fairness.
Of course, my aim has been to outline the problem and
propose a general solution rather than exposing in detail a
specific intervention. The latter task indeed would require much
more space and research. Nevertheless, it is easily conceivable
that the use of enhancers will spread in society beyond
those specific areas, to the point of having to implement the
compensatory and rebalancing measures proposed here.
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